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Dutch Political Attitudes in Asia:
Diplomacy in Eighteenth Century Ceylon as Example1)
Alicia Schrikker
 Diplomacy formed an essential element in Dutch commercial politics in Asia 
in the 17th and 18th century.2) In the 17th century the VOC (Verenigde Oost-
Indische Compagnie; Dutch East India Company) managed to maintain a large 
network of trading posts throughout Asia. In many cases the Dutch depended on 
local rulers for approval to establish such factories and to conduct their trade in 
the region. The Dutch extorted these concessions occasionally by military, but 
more often by diplomatic means. Dutch diplomacy in Asia was surprisingly suc-
cessful. Perhaps the most powerful example of this success is found in Japan, 
where the Dutch were the only ones allowed to trade after the Shogun had effec-
tively expelled the Portuguese and other foreign traders from his country in 1639. 
From then onwards, the Dutch each year sent embassies from Deshima to Edo to 
pay respect to the Shogun. From 1790 onwards the frequency of these embassies 
diminished to once every four years. These embassies revolved around court 
rituals, gifts and exchange of knowledge and served to reaffi rm the relations 
between the two parties.3) In a similar fashion, the Dutch sent envoys regularly 
to many other courts in Asia like Siam, Madurai and Golconda in South India and 
 1） I would like to thank the staff members of ICIS for inviting me to the very inspiring conference: 
‘Cultural Reproduction on its Interface’ at Kansai University, 13–14 December 2008. I would like 
to thank Dr. Okamoto Hiromichi and Prof. Wang Zhenping in particular for their useful comments.
 2） Jur van Goor, ‘Merchants as diplomats: embassies as an illustration of European-Asian relations.’ in: 
J. van Goor, Prelude to colonialism. The Dutch in Asia.  Hilversum: Verloren, 2004) Blussé, Blussé, 
J.L. (2001). Among Feigned Friends and Declared Enemies. In S. Gogner (Ed.), Making Sense of 
Global History (pp. 154–168). Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
 3） Leonard Blussé, Willem Remmelink and Ivo Smits (red.) Bewogen betrekkingen. 400 jaar Neder-
land-japan (Hilversum: Teleac, 2000). 37.
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Kandy in Sri Lanka. Embassies of a more incidental nature, but of a similar 
character, were sent to the Qing emperor of China, the Shah of Persia and the 
Great Mogul. These embassies can be seen as a crossing point, or an interface, 
of Asian-European cultural reproduction in the early modern period.
 In their reports of the diplomatic missions of the VOC in the various regions 
in Asia, the Dutch often expressed their awkwardness in relation to the rituals that 
they had to perform at these local courts. In most cases the Dutch were asked to 
follow the local protocol of paying homage to the ruler physically by walking on 
their knees, or crawling towards the king, emperor, shogun or sultan in question. 
The rituals together with the tributes that were brought to the specifi c courts 
functioned as a means to reaffi rm the hierarchy between the two parties and fur-
nished the court in question with luxury trade items. The Dutch at the same time 
introduced their own tool of fi xing their bilateral relations by stipulating agree-
ments in contracts that were to be signed by the two parties. Rituals, gifts and 
contracts therefore formed three elements that could be used as bargaining tools 
during the diplomatic processes.4)
 One of the issues that has been much debated is the role of rituals in Euro-
pean diplomatic contact with East Asia . The kowtow ritual at the Qing court for 
example has received much attention over the past decades. The refusal of the 
British ambassador Macartney in the late 18th century to comply to such rituals, 
which he considered morally unacceptable and humiliating for an ambassador of 
the powerful British King, is seen by some as a typical clash between traditional 
Eastern and the modern Western political traditions and by others as an example 
of cultural misapprehensions between the East and the West. Historians have also 
used this example to contrast the British attitude with that of the Dutch in this 
period. In this view, the fact that the Dutch ambassadors Van Braam and Titsingh, 
who went on an embassy to Beijing one year after Macartney, followed the Qing 
court rituals without any objection, demonstrates that the Dutch political practices 
and morals were not as modern or enlightened as those of the British.5)
 I wonder whether the cultural interaction between Asian and European 
powers that took place in this specifi c diplomatic context are best be understood 
 4） C.H. Alexandrowicz, An introduction to the history of the law of nationa in the East Indies (Oxford: 
Clarendon 1967).
 5） Blussé, Visible cities 83–88.
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in terms of clashes, misunderstandings and (absence of) modernity. For example, 
Bhawan Ruangsilp has studied the Dutch perceptions of the court of Ayutthaya 
and has argued convincingly that the Dutch were very well informed about the 
cultural and political situation there and that they very consciously adapted them-
selves to the local diplomatic culture to obtain their trade concessions.6) Therefore 
I would argue that it makes more sense to look at the specifi c political economic 
context, and the interests at stake of both parties at the specifi c embassies in ques-
tion. In what way were Asian and European diplomatic traditions moulded to their 
specifi c political and economic interests of both parties? Or in other words: in 
what way could the specifi c political and economic interests of both parties infl u-
ence the cultural reproduction on the diplomatic interface?
 For this paper Sri Lanka will serve as a case study to get a better understand-
ing of the Dutch political attitude in Asia at the time. In Ceylon in the second 
half of the eighteenth century the Dutch position vis-à-vis the king of Kandy and 
the other European powers underwent major changes and this infl uenced the 
diplomatic relations between the two parties. I will analyze the diplomatic rela-
tionship between the Dutch and the kingdom of Kandy in that period, with special 
emphasis on the role of court rituals in the diplomatic process.7)
De VOC and Ceylon
 Who thinks of Ceylon nowadays, thinks of tea. But when the Dutch fi rst set 
foot on Ceylon, they were only interested in the cinnamon that was produced on 
the island. One could make fortunes on the European markets with this Ceylonese 
cinnamon. For this reason the Portuguese had established themselves on the island 
in the sixteenth century and had extended their power there in the course of the 
17th century. In 1658, after twenty years of warfare, the Dutch took over the 
Portuguese position on the island. The ambitious Dutch merchants in turn strived 
for a monopoly on the trade in cinnamon. There strategy was simple: by oversee-
 6） Bhawan Ruangsilp, Dutch East India Company merchants at the court of Ayutthaya: Dutch percep-
tions of the Thai kingdom, 1604–1765 (Leiden: Brill 2007).
 7） This analysis of Dutch-Kandyan relations is largely based on my PhD research about Dutch and 
British colonial policies in Sri Lanka, which I conducted from 2002 tot 2006. It resulted in the fol-
lowing publication: Dutch and British colonial intervention in Sri Lanka, 1780–1815: expansion 
and reform. BRILL, Leiden 2007.
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ing the production of cinnamon and controlling the coastal areas of the island, 
they prevented that cinnamon was exported from the island by others. In this way 
the Dutch could decide the price for cinnamon on the European markets and make 
enormous profi ts. The larger part of these profi ts benefi tted the organization of 
the VOC in the Netherlands and that is why Ceylon turned out a complicated post 
for the VOC.
 The control of the cinnamon production and trade demanded a far-reaching 
intervention with the local society on the island. Initially, cinnamon was gained 
from the cinnamon tree that was only found wild in the forest in the southwest 
of the island. A Dutch captain of cinnamon headed the cinnamon department and 
it was his task to ascertain that the members of the caste of cinnamon peelers, or 
chalias, executed their duties and collected the cinnamon from the forest for the 
VOC. Moreover, the control of the island’s trade could only be secured if the 
Company maintained various garrisoned forts along the coast. The three larger 
ports on the island, Jaffna in the North, Colombo in the west and Galle in the 
south carried the responsibility for the administration of the smaller forts and their 
direct hinterlands. The governor seated in Colombo together with his council. The 
government in Colombo was in turn subordinated to the High Government in 
Batavia and the board of directors, or Gentlemen Seventeen, in the Netherlands. 
While initially the VOC had only settled on the island to secure the cinnamon 
trade, in the course of the eighteenth century it developed into a colonial ruler of 
the coastal areas. In order to pay for the expanding administration, the VOC more 
and more depended on revenues obtained through effi cient appropriation of the 
local systems of taxation.
 The Dutch sovereignty on the island was contested by the court of Kandy, 
the last indigenous kingdom on the island, located in the mountainous interior. 
Rajasinha II had initially invited the Dutch to jointly oust the Portuguese, but 
when the Dutch claimed the right to take over the Portuguese possessions on the 
island, Rajasinha turned against the Dutch. During the fi rst twenty years after the 
Dutch had expelled the Portuguese from the island, the VOC and Kandy were 
engaged in a war. The Dutch-Kandyan relationship entered into a new phase when 
from 1688 onwards warfare was replaced by diplomacy and embassies between 
the two parties were exchanged on a regular basis.
 The Dutch reports of the embassies to Kandy that are kept in the VOC 
archives in The Hague appeal to one’s imagination and do remind us of the 
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embassies conducted by the Dutch elsewhere in Asia. One reads about the exotic 
European gifts that they were requested to bring as a tribute for the king, like 
clocks and compasses, but they also brought horses and exclusive silks from 
Northern India. Furthermore, just like at most of the other courts in Asia, the 
Dutch ambassadors were expected to pay honor to the king by performing certain 
rituals, which included extensive bowing and kneeling for the king, while carry-
ing letters from their governor for the king on a silver plate on their head. It 
speaks for itself that these rituals symbolically confi rmed the subservience of the 
Dutch to the king of Kandy. Apart from keeping peace the main aim of these 
embassies for the Dutch was to ask the king permission to send their cinnamon 
peelers into the king’s forest, if the king prohibited this they would be short of 
supply. The Dutch envoys never set eyes on the king directly, the king kept 
himself hidden behind the curtain at the end of the audience hall. Political ques-
tions were not discussed with the king directly but always via his prime ministers. 
During the journey up the mountains to the court, the Dutch envoys frequently 
met with the ministers and that is where the negotiations between the two parties 
really took place8).
A delicate balance, the importance of rituals 1688–1740
 The historian Tikiri Abeysinghe has analyzed the Dutch embassies to Kandy 
between 1688 and 1740 and concluded that in this period the embassies grew to 
be more and more institutionalized. This was the result of a growing sense of 
identity on the part of the Kandyan King on the one hand and a decline of Dutch 
power on the other. He argues that because these embassies were now regularly 
performed and the Dutch travelled to the palace to pay honors and gifts, the king 
perceived them as vassals of his state. Moreover, the Dutch usually got there in 
the beginning of April, just before the New Year, which was the time that all the 
subordinates paid their däkum to the king.9) This mechanism, of using rituals at 
 8） More on diplomatic instruments in this period: L.J. Wagenaar, “‘Met Eer En Respect.’ Diplomatieke 
Contacten Tussen De Voc-Gouverneur in Colombo En Het Hof Van Het Koninkrijk Kandy, 1703-
1707,” in Hof En Handel. Aziatische Vorsten En De Voc 1620–1720, ed. Elsbeth Locher-Scholten en 
Peter Rietbergen (Leiden: KITLV, 2004).
 9） Tikiri Abeyasinghe, “Princes and Merchants: Relations between the Kings of Kandy and the Dutch 
East India Company in Sri Lanka (1688–1740).” The Sri Lanka Archives 2 (1984). 35–60.
Cultural Reproduction on its Interface
48
the embassy to affi rm the position of the foreign trader as a subordinate vassal, 
reminds very much of the practices at the Chinese and Japanese courts.
 But the relationship between the Dutch and Kandy was more complex than 
that, after all the bargaining position of the Dutch on Sri Lanka was much stron-
ger than at he East Asian courts. The historian S. Arasaratnam has convincingly 
argued that although the Kandyans were politically dominant, the Dutch kept a 
fi rm grip on the Kandyans by isolating them from the rest of the world.10) For the 
most part, they controlled the trade of the kingdom and its communications with 
South India and as a result the Court of Kandy became heavily dependent on the 
Dutch. Until the 1750s the situation on the island was such: the Dutch were 
dependent on the Kandyans for the legitimacy of their power on the island, and 
were therefore formally considered as vassals of the King. In practice, the Kan-
dyans largely depended on the Dutch for all communications and trade with South 
India and the Buddhist establishments in the Southeast Asian mainland. The only 
way for them to put pressure on the Dutch was by denying them the permission 
to peel cinnamon in their territory. This obliged the Dutch to continue with the 
performance of the embassies and follow the protocols imposed by the king, even 
though they felt uncomfortable with it.
The road to war: changing self-perceptions of both parties 1740–1766
 The so-called cohabitation lasted for almost seventy years, but from the 
1740s onwards, tension once again dominated the relationship between the two 
powers on the island. The Kandyans were more and more determined to have 
their ports back and did not want to be hindered in their South Asian trade and 
contacts. The revival of the Buddhist order on the island and the accession of a 
new dynasty to the crown played major roles in the new self-defi nition of the 
court. At the same time, due to the increasing colonial intervention in the hinter-
land of the three major forts Jaffna, Galle, and Colombo, the Dutch began to 
consider their position on the island as more signifi cant than that of mere vassals. 
Consequently they felt that they ought not to be forced to perform the humiliating 
rituals at the yearly embassies. Moreover, the yearly embassies were very costly 
and the Dutch preferred to abandon these at all if possible. In their letters and 
10） Sinappah Arasaratnam, “The Kingdom of Kandy: Aspects of Its External Relations and Commerce.,” 
in Ceylon and the Dutch, 1600–1800. (Aldershot: VARIORUM, 1996). 109–127.
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reports home the Dutch governors now increasingly described the Kandyan king 
as unreliable, powerless and deceiving.11)
 With the self-perception of both parties changing and tension built up, diplo-
macy failed as a tool to defi ne the relation between the two parties and instead 
war broke out. It is diffi cult to give a brief and clear overview of the develop-
ments that led to the war. L. Dewaraja and D.A. Kotelawela have described how 
internal developments in the kingdom, the commencement of a new dynasty and 
the revival of Buddhism, changed the attitude of the Kandyan king towards the 
Dutch. They also explain how the Dutch in turn attempted to make use of internal 
strife and intrigued with certain court offi cials.12) Tension was built up over the 
1750s. In the end, two events triggered war between the two parties in late 1760, 
which would last until February 1766: fi rst, there was the Kandyan support for a 
rebellion in the South Western district of Matara, after the implementation of rigid 
agricultural policies by the Governor Jan Schreuder. Second there was a plot to 
depose of the king by certain monks and nobles, with possible aid from the Dutch.
 The Kandyans fi rst managed to overthrow some of the Dutch forts, but after 
the arrival of reinforcements from Batavia, the Netherlands and the Indian facto-
ries, the Dutch managed to get a grip on the situation. After taking back the old 
possessions, the governor Lubbert Jan van Eck decided to march up to the 
Kandyan capital. For some months in 1765 they managed to keep hold of the 
capital, but lack of food supplies and constant guerrilla-like provocation by the 
Kandyan troops, led them to abandon the capital. About half a year later, on the 
14th of February 1766, both parties signed a peace treaty. This treaty was by all 
means advantageous for the Dutch and underlined their military superiority on the 
island, despite their drawback from the capital.13)
11） See for example the description of Kandy in the Memoir of Jan Schreuder 1757–1762 translated by 
E. Reimers. Colombo 1946.
12） D.A. Kotelawele, “The Voc in Sri Lanka 1688–1766: Problems and Policies,” in University of Per-
andeniya History of Sri Lanka. Volume 2 (C1500 to C1800). ed. K.M. de Silva, University of Cey-
lon (Peradenyia) History of Ceylon (Sri Lanka). (Dehiwala: Sridevi, 1995). 233–280. L.S. 
Dewaraja, “The Kandyan Kingdom and the Nayakkers, 1739–1796.,” in University of Perandeniya 
History of Sri Lanka. Volume 2 (C1500 to C1800). ed. K.M. de Silva, University of Ceylon (Perad-
enyia) History of Ceylon (Sri Lanka). (Dehiwala: SRIDEVI, 1995). 281–320.
13） L.J. Wagenaar, “Knielen of Buigen? De Gezantschappen Van De Compagnie Naar Kandy Na Het 
Vredesverdrag Van 1766,” in Kapitaal Ondernemerschap En Beleid, ed. Davids & Frisky (Amster-
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Embassies without rituals 1766–1782
 In 1766 a new balance of power between Kandy and the Dutch was reached 
and this was directly refl ected in the diplomatic relationship between the two 
parties. From 1766 onwards the Dutch offi cial policy aimed at the observation of 
all articles that were settled in the treaty. The yearly embassies continued to be 
the main feature of the Dutch-Kandyan diplomatic relationship, but it was decided 
to drop all humiliating rituals, which the Dutch had had to perform in earlier 
times. Embassies now went back and forth, the Kandyans usually arriving in 
Colombo in January, and the Dutch travelling to Kandy in March or April. The 
Dutch offi cially lost their vassal status and were supposedly considered as equal 
sovereigns on the island. At the same time economic control, which the Dutch 
had held over the Kandyan territory, grew to be even tighter.14)
 The settlement between the two parties after the war was advantageous for 
the Dutch and ensured the control of the two spearheads of Dutch policy towards 
the Kandyans. First the Dutch were allowed to peel cinnamon in the king’s ter-
ritories every season, as far as the mountain of Ballane. As formerly, they had to 
request permission offi cially at a yearly embassy, but the character of these 
embassies had changed fundamentally. After all, the Dutch were now in a good 
bargaining position since they possessed the coastal saltpans near Puttalam on the 
West coast, north from Colombo, and near Matara in the south-east, which had 
formerly been in Kandyan hands. Thus, in exchange of the admission to peel 
cinnamon, the Dutch allowed the Kandyans to collect salt in their maritime dis-
tricts. The second issue was the exclusion of the Kandyans from all foreign 
contacts, especially with regard to other European nations. The Dutch feared that 
the Kandyans would otherwise undermine the Company’s cinnamon monopoly 
and that other European powers would try to establish themselves on the island. 
Contact with South Indian powers or with Buddhist establishments in Arakan and 
Siam was to be conducted through the Company. Even when relatives of the king 
dam: NEHA, 1996). 441–466. A.F. Schrikker, “Een ongelijke strijd? De oorlog tussen de Verenigde 
Oost-Indische Compagnie en de koning van Kandy, 1760–1766.” (An unequal battle? The war 
between the Dutch East India Company and the king of Kandy, 1760–1766.) In: Gerrit Knaap en 
Ger Teitler, De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie tussen oorlog en diplomatie. Leiden, 2002.
14） Sinappah Arasaratnam, “Dutch Sovereignty in Ceylon: A Historical Survey of Its Problems,” in: 
Sinappah Arasaratnam,  Ceylon and the Dutch, 1600–1800, (Aldershot: VARIORUM, 1996). 105–
121.
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had to travel to and from Madurai or if brides of the king had to be collected in 
South India, the co-operation of the Company was requested.15)
 The treaty made it possible for the Dutch to enforce a conscious policy of 
isolation of the kingdom and of making the kingdom totally dependent on them. 
Isolation of the kingdom was what they had always aimed for, but they were now 
in a much better position to impose it upon the Kandyans and therefore this policy 
was now much more effective. The Kandyans on the other hand never intended 
to fully comply with all the articles of the treaty, which they felt were imposed 
on them. In the fi rst years after the war the fear of Dutch aggression prevented 
them from disputing the treaty and as a result, for about sixteen years after the 
conclusion of the treaty, Dutch-Kandyan relations were relatively smooth, despite 
some quarrels on the fi xation of the new frontiers.16)
 The Dutch abandoned the rituals in the embassies when opportunity arose, 
not so much for moral reasons, but because it refl ected the power relations at the 
time. At the same time, the Kandyans actively tried to enhance their bargaining 
position by establishing direct contact with the French and British competitors of 
the Dutch on the Indian coast. And so we fi rst fi nd the Kandyans contacting the 
French through their South Indian relatives in the late 1770s.17) By doing so they 
touched the Dutch on their weakest spot, for if there was one thing the Dutch 
feared, it was the growing expansion of the French and British in South Asia. 
When in 1782, during the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, Trincomale was occupied by 
the British. The British ambassador Hugh Boyd was enthusiastically received by 
15） NA VOC 3571 ff 94, 96, 119–200, 16–8 1780: princesses for the King of Kandy. VOC 3842 7/5 
1790 contact with the Nabab of Carnatica. For a good analyses of the role the Dutch played in 
Kandyan relationship with Siam and Arakan See L. Wagenaar, ‘The arrival of Buddhist monks 
from Siam in 1753. Mid-eighteenth century religious contact between Kandy and Siam, as recorded 
by the Dutch East India Company’ in: Dhiravat na Pombejra, Han ten Brummelhuis, Nandana 
Chutiwongs, Pisit Charoenwongsa, Proceedings of the International Symposium ‘Crossroads of Thai 
and Dutch history’ Bangkok Seameo-Spafa 2007.
16） This had to do with a disagreement on the measurement on the distances between the shore and the 
border. The Kandyan measurements did not concur with the Dutch: obviously the Dutch measured 
a wider strip of land than the Kandyans.
17） Mudaliyar C. Rasanayagam, “Tamil Documents in the Government Archives.,” Historical manu-
scripts commission, Ceylon. 3 (1937). The French, at that point allied with the Dutch, kindly 
declined the offer of the King. Pp 18–22, referring to Tamil letters in the Sri Lanka National 
archives nos. K45, K24, K38, K43 and K 64.
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the Kandyan monarch.18) The British aimed at a treaty between the two powers 
to oust the Dutch, but the Kandyans feared that in this way the Dutch would be 
replaced by only a more aggressive power.
The rituals return (1782–1790)
 Despite its limited results, Boyd’s mission placed the Dutch in an awkward 
position. They had to be grateful now for the Kandyan court not taking its chance 
with the British and, moreover, the court expected something in return. The his-
torian Wagenaar has described how in 1782 the humiliating rituals at the yearly 
embassies to the court were put in effect again despite Dutch opposition. The 
Dutch could not refuse its execution anymore, because Hugh Boyd had performed 
all rituals at his embassy earlier that year and they feared that if they refused, the 
Kandyans would decide to ally with the British after all. The British interest in 
Sri Lanka had given the Kandyans a perfect political tool to renegotiate the power 
relations on the island. Apart from the re-installation of the rituals, it led to 
increasing pressure from the court to return some of the coastal ports in the 
western region.19) Indeed after 1782 it was this issue, which determined the rela-
tionship between the two powers, the bargaining power was again in the hands 
of the Kandyans.
 At their yearly embassy in the spring of 1784 the Dutch came to understand 
that they were not allowed to peel cinnamon in the King’s land because of the 
ports question. Governor Falck attempted to soothe the Kandyans, by stating that 
it was only because of the European threat that the shores could not be given 
back. He argued that this was even in their own advantage because the Dutch 
protected them from other European invaders. He also maintained that not giving 
permission to peel the cinnamon was an act absolutely unacceptable, since they 
were befriended powers.20) During the embassy of the Kandyans in Colombo in 
January, one year later, Falck pointed out desperately that it really was not up to 
18） Sinharaja Tammita-Delgoda, “The English East India Company and Sri Lanka 1760–1796,” in Uni-
versity of Perandeniya History of Sri Lanka. Volume 2 (C1500 to C1800). ed. K.M. de Silva, Uni-
versity of Ceylon (Peradenyia) History of Ceylon (Sri Lanka). (Dehiwala: SRIDEVI, 1995). 531–
552. V.L.B. Mendis, The Advent of the British to Ceylon, 1762–1802 (Dehiwala: Tisara Praka-
sakayo, 1971). 52–79.
19） Wagenaar, “Knielen of Buigen?.” 441–446.
20） NA VOC 3664 20/3 1784, Falck to the dessava of the 3 and 4 korles.
Dutch Political Attitudes in Asia
53
him to hand back the ports, but that it was something that could only be decided 
by his superiors.21) In his last years as Governor, Falck could not take a fi rm stand 
anymore towards the court.22) It is clear that the Boyd episode had given the 
Kandyans a new bargaining position, which led to a new crisis in the relationship 
between the Kandyan court and the Dutch. It was however not Falck who had to 
deal with this crisis situation, since he passed away on the 6th of February 1785.23)
 With the tension between the two powers build up in the last years of Falck’s 
reign, it is remarkable that Van de Graaff soon managed to relax the situation. 
After his accession to the offi ce of governor he stated to his council that it was 
his intention to make the Company independent from the court as soon as pos-
sible. By speeding up the creation of cinnamon plantations in the Colombo and 
Galle district, he hoped that the Company would soon be self suffi cient in the 
production of this valuable spice. Until that time, he would make use of the salt 
boycott whenever necessary to put pressure on the Kandyans. He also took 
serious measures against the smuggling of this product.24) From his reports it 
seems that his policy of pacifi cation was successful, and that he managed to 
control the crisis.
 Until 1789 the reports of embassies are positive, the Company was free to 
peel cinnamon in the Kandyan territory and the relationship seems to have been 
cordial.25) Though yearly requests for the shores occurred, these were usually left 
undiscussed. Batavia appears to have been content with this and agreed with Van 
de Graaff that the negative answer of the Gentlemen Seventeen to their demands 
should be postponed as long as the Kandyans were well disposed towards the 
Company.26) The cordial atmosphere between the two parties is refl ected in the 
report of the embassy to Kandy that took place in 1786. The Dutch had brought 
21） NA VOC 3665 …/1 1785, folio 1032–1034 notes on the dealings with the Kandyan envoys.
22） In a fi nal attempt to appease the court he approved of the Kandyans sending a letter with similar 
requests to the Gentlemen Seventeen in the Netherlands via commander Jacob Pieter Van Braam 
who was at that moment passing-by Ceylon with his squadron. This was obviously an attempt to 
mediate and to postpone giving any fi nal answers to the Kandyans. It also placed the responsibility 
of further developments with his superiors.
23） NA VOC 3692, resolution in council 6/2 1785.
24） NA VOC 3692 resolution in council 10/2 1785.
25） NA VOC 3841, 27/1 1790.
26） V. Kanapathypillai, Dutch rule in maritime Ceylon 156–170.
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musicians to the court and the King was very pleased to hear them play and see 
them dance. In return the Dutch ambassadors were treated with a two hour ele-
phant show. The elephants performed seventeen different tricks and the ambas-
sadors were so impressed by this that they described these one by one in their 
report and they stressed several times report how unique this experience had 
been.27)
Abandoning diplomacy
 From 1789 onwards, a new phase of Dutch-Kandyan relations commenced. 
By 1790 the cinnamon plantations set up by the governor were yielding well. 
More in general Van Graaff can be regarded as an enterprising governor, under 
whose governorship the colonial intervention in the coastal regions of Ceylon 
intensifi ed. Van de Graaff tried to improve the agricultural production of the 
country in order to increase the revenue from the taxes and he rationalized the 
native administration of the region. Under his governorship an acceleration took 
place in the colonial state formation process, a process that was to be continued 
by the British in 1796. It is not diffi cult to understand that under such circum-
stances the governor would support any opportunity to get rid of the king of 
Kandy who would always form a threat to Dutch sovereignty on the island and 
could hamper his grand colonial schemes. He therefore saw it as an advantage 
that in the course of the 1780s the political situation at the court had become 
unstable, with two factions opposing each other. Van de Graaff decided to intrigue 
with one of the factions of the court and made plans to depose of the king. Of 
course this was kept a secret for his superiors at fi rst, because they would never 
approve of this intriguing.
 In May 1791 an expedition was commenced under the pretext that the cin-
namon peelers needed protection. The expedition was supposedly without much 
risk because one of the courtiers, who held extensive lands in that area, had 
promised Van de Graaff that his people would support the Dutch. The expedition 
lasted no more than four days. Colonel de Meuron28), who headed the expedition, 
returned so soon because of bad weather circumstances and an absence of the 
27） NA VOC 3720, report on the embassy to Kandy 13/4 1787, ff. 107–109.
28） Colonel de Meuron was chief of the Regiment de Meuron, which was placed on Ceylon in 1788 for 
its defense.
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promised local support for his troops. Eventually Van de Graaff’s plans had 
failed.29)
 In the mean time Van de Graaff learned that the court had corresponded with 
the French in Pondicherry and had asked them for help.30) This gave him another 
excuse to make a second war scheme but he was prevented from putting this into 
practice by his superiors in Batavia. The relationship between the governor and 
the court relaxed a little in the autumn of 1792, when the borders between the 
two territories were again opened and the Kandyan people were allowed again to 
come down to trade. Van de Graaff waited anxiously for the fi rst Kanydan envoys 
to come down to Colombo, it was beyond his pride to send one up fi rst. Corre-
spondence between the two powers was now cold and detached. This situation 
lasted until mid 1795, when the new governor Johan Gerard van Angelbeek, 
confronted with the British ascension on the island, reopened negotiations with 
the court, in order to prevent the Kandyans from siding with the British. This 
approach could however not prevent the British from taking over the Dutch pos-
sessions on the island in the same year. From 1790 onwards, no actual diplomatic 
meetings occurred again between the two powers.31)
Conclusion
 The Dutch-Kandyan relationship in the 18th century was very changeable and 
tense at times. Embassies were used as an instrument to maintain the relationship 
and to reaffi rm the relative power of the two parties. Rituals played an important 
role in the diplomatic exchange and political bargaining that took place during 
the embassies. At the beginning of the century the Kandyans had the upper hand 
in the diplomatic negotiations and the Kandyan political culture dominated the 
29） NA HR 532 ff 98/99. The colonel was instructed to judge for himself the feasibility of Eknelligoda’s 
plans. (f.43).
30） NA VOC 3975 18/3 1792 correspondence between Colombo and Pondicherry and 8/1 1793 Colombo 
to Batavia with recapitulation of the whole affair. Some of the letters are to be found among the 
Tamil letters in the Sri Lanka National archives Rasanayagam, “Tamil Documents.” 23–28.
31） SLNA 1/3350 letters relating to Kandy 1791–1795. many letters between 1793 and 1795 concern the 
question of the embassies. From September 1795 the letters of Van Angelbeek concern the English. 
NA Col. Nederburgh 442, memorie van Overgave Governor Van de Graaff to his successor Johan 
Gerard van Angelbeek, July 15th 1794, §260–261. NA VOC 3975 11/1 1793, Colombo to Batavia 
644–645.
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relationship, which was expressed most powerfully in the rituals that the Dutch 
ambassadors had to perform at the court. But in the course of the eighteenth 
century this changed substantially and eventually the rituals themselves became 
part of the political negotiations. During the whole century the delicate balance 
between the two powers was broken only once by war for a period of four years 
in the 1760s. This war resulted in a new treaty between the two parties and the 
position of the Dutch was enhanced by the stipulation that the rituals that had 
served to express the inferiority of the Dutch vis-à-vis the king could be aban-
doned. Now that the Dutch gained the upper hand in the relationship, a typical 
European political-cultural tool, a written treaty, had replaced the rituals – the 
local way to express and confi rm bilateral relations. But interestingly the rituals 
were put into effect again for a short period when there was a threat of a British-
Kandyan liaison in 1782. It once more shows how changeable the power balance 
was on the island and how clearly this infl uenced the cultural practice during the 
diplomatic exchanges.
 The international situation, the growing interest of the British and French for 
the island, and the self perceptions of the Dutch and the Kandyans were the major 
factors that infl uenced the relationship between the two parties. When reading the 
report of the Dutch embassy of 1786, where relations seems cordial and the Dutch 
performed the rituals without much complaining one might conclude that the 
Dutch-Kandyan relationship had returned to its traditional mode of co-habitation. 
This was however not the case. After all the Dutch position on the island had 
changed considerably. Indeed when in 1790 the cinnamon plantations were yield-
ing and Van de Graaff’s colonial ambitions became stronger the Dutch, diplomacy 
was abandoned and attempts were made to get rid of the King. Political instabil-
ity at the court provided the Dutch governor with an opportunity to plan schemes 
with Kandyan ministers to depose of the king and place a marionette on the 
throne.
 This case study of the Kandyan-Dutch relations in the eighteenth century 
teaches us two things. First of all, reports of Dutch embassies to Asian courts 
provide us with wonderful material to analyze Dutch-Asian diplomatic relations 
and cultural interaction. It is also clear that these should not be studied in isola-
tion. It is very important to understand the local context in which the Dutch 
operated and to understand how the political relations between the two parties 
developed over time. Comparisons between the diplomatic practices and tradi-
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tions between the Dutch and Asian courts may lead to a more general analysis of 
how Asian and European political cultures merged in the early modern period.
 Secondly, the question of abiding to the local court rituals, which were per-
ceived as humiliating by the Europeans in their contact with Asian powers, turned 
out to be very much related to the relative power and interests of the Dutch in 
the respective regions. There was no over-all sense of European moral superiority 
that caused the Dutch to strive for abandonment of the rituals, but the Dutch had 
more pragmatic and concrete political considerations. The case of Ceylon also 
shows how such considerations changed over time. In Ceylon the Dutch were 
eventually anxious to abandon the rituals when their power in the second half of 
the eighteenth century was on the rise, because they were very conscious of the 
fact that the rituals functioned as a cultural expression to emphasize an unequal 
relationship between the two parties. Elsewhere in Asia, the Dutch easily con-
fi rmed to the unequal relationship and the rituals were used to achieve their own 
goals, thereby serving the mutual interest of both parties.
